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Abstract: The article examines the 2008-9 crisis responses in Mexico and Turkey as 
examples of variegated neoliberalism. The simultaneous interests of corporations and banks 
relative to the national fixing of capital and their mobility in the form of global investment 
heavily influenced each state authority’s policy responses to the crisis at the expense of the 
interests of the poor, workers, and peasantry. Rather than pitching this as either evidence of 
persistent national differentiation or some Keynesian state resurgence, we argue from a 
historical materialist geographical framework that the responses of capital and state 
authorities in Mexico and Turkey actively constitute and reconstitute the global parameters 
of market regulatory design and neoliberal class rule through each state’s distinct domestic 
policy formation and crisis management processes. While differing in specific content the 
form of Mexico and Turkey’s state responses to the crisis ensured continuity in their 
foregoing neoliberal strategies of development and capital accumulation, most notably in 
the continued oppression of workers. That is, the prevailing strategy of accumulation 
continues to be variegated neoliberalism. 
 
Keywords: variegated neoliberalism, state power, capital fixity, capital mobility, Mexico, 
Turkey. 
 
Abbreviated article title: Capital Fixity and Mobility and the 2008-09 Crisis in Mexico and 
Turkey. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The comparative study of Turkey and Mexico can provide unique insights into the 
dynamics of the 2008-9 crisis. Accounts of the global crisis that spread globally in late 
2008 and early 2009 crisis often portray the BRICS as successful cases of economic growth 
based on a combination of state-led export and investment promotion with sound financial 
policies (cf. The Economist, 2012; Bremmer, 2009; IMF, 2010a; Keely and Love, 2010: 
24). The advanced capitalisms, by contrast, are often depicted as examples of state failure, 
in terms of irresponsible financial policies and weak regulatory authority alongside some 
examples of market failure led by a few bad banking apples (cf. Canuto, Leipziger and 
Pinto, 2012; IMF, 2010a; World Bank, 2012). The study of Mexico and Turkey in this 
juncture has been somewhat overlooked – and even more so in comparative terms – since 
the crisis did not originate in these countries, due to the popularity of the core BRICS cases 
among commentators, and because of Mexico and Turkey’s seemingly rapid pace of 
economic recovery. Yet these two societies are OECD members that uniquely border two 
of the world’s most powerful political and economic regions, the US and EU. Both 
countries, moreover, experienced the first and last of the major neoliberal financial crises 
(Mexico 1994 and Turkey 2001) characteristic of the lost half decade of the 1990s. Since 
then authorities have restructured state-capital relations in ways that have allowed Mexico 
and Turkey to become members of major international forums like the 2009 Financial 
Stability Board – an international body intended to manage the current global crisis. Yet on 
most social indicators Mexico and Turkey perform abysmally with workers generally worse 
off today that before market reforms. 
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For our purposes, the comparative cases of Mexico and Turkey help to demonstrate 
the ways in which crisis-driven neoliberal strategies of accumulation have been 
implemented and reinvented according to each society’s domestic political economy and its 
integration into the financial world market (cf. Muñoz Martinez, 2008; Marois, 2011). Both 
countries share histories of structural adjustment policies and export-led development 
strategies that swept globally since the 1980s. Yet as in most cases of neoliberal 
transformation their institutional landscapes and class structure characteristics continue to 
maintain specificities (cf. Albo, 2005; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010). Our study fills a 
gap in the developmental and international political economy literature in three ways. First, 
state intervention during the 2008-9 crisis through stimulus packages, expansion of credit 
and access to liquidity towards national companies was premised on the idea that national 
capital was more loyal to the economy, resulting into more employment and economic 
growth (Andersen, 2009). This assumption ignores that domestic capitalist might have as 
much interest as foreign capitalists to move their money away from their home economy as 
seen in the case of Mexico and Turkey. Thus, this type of state intervention might end up 
strengthening existing domestic structures of power instead of improving the living 
conditions of the population in general. Second, our examination of the Mexican and 
Turkish cases seeks to locate the agents within the capitalist class and the state in both 
countries in order to understand the concrete social forces that influence economic policy-
making. This is central to the questioning of the domestic structures of power in its 
articulation with unequal global economic and political structures in order to propose 
alternative policies to neoliberalism. Third, most institutional comparative studies tend to 
overemphasise domestic specificity at the expense of simultaneously constituted and 
modified universalising capitalist structures missing the opportunity to contribute to how 
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national differences constitute a universal if malleable global neoliberalism (e.g., Martinez-
Diaz, 2009; Öniş and Burak Güven, 2011) 
As our point of departure we examine Mexico and Turkey’s official responses to the 
2008-09 global financial crisis in their borders. In unique ways, the simultaneous interests 
of corporations and banks relative to the national fixing of capital and their mobility in the 
form of global investment heavily influenced each state authority’s policy responses to the 
crisis. The interests of the poor, workers, and peasantry, by contrast, found little traction. 
Rather than pitching this as either evidence of persistent national differentiation or some 
Keynesian state resurgence, we argue from a historical materialist geographical framework 
that the responses of capital and state authorities in Mexico and Turkey actively constitute 
and reconstitute the global parameters of market regulatory design and neoliberal class rule 
through each state’s distinct domestic policy formation and crisis management processes. 
The comparison analytically and concretely deepens the notion of variegated capitalism, 
and in doing so enables a critically informed and evidence-based approach to alternative 
development policy formation (cf. Peck and Theodore, 2007). 
A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST ALTERNATIVE: FRAMING CAPITAL FIXITY AND 
MOBILITY IN CRISIS 
Geographical political economy asks how social relations are territorially grounded and 
how space shapes and is simultaneously shaped by economic and political power and social 
struggle (cf. Swyingedouw 2000). Capital mobility and fixity are two internally dimensions 
of the same spatial processes of capital accumulation. This is shaped by the interaction of 
contentious social forces, which for our purposes involves class structures, capital, and state 
authorities. In this formulation, it is important to recall that from a historical materialist 
perspective, capital is an exploitative and unequal social relation that exists between capital 
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and labour, is historically specific, and is the way in which value is preserved and 
multiplied through the appropriation of surplus labour (Marx, 1978, p. 40). Moreover, as 
capital does not move in the form of production money is necessary for the repositioning of 
productive processes. The credit system in general and fictitious capital in particular are 
historically specific ways owners of money can move money across borders and into 
different sectors of the economy in search of valorisation. Today private fictitious capital 
claims take the form of shares, bonds, credits, and financial derivatives based on expected 
future surplus labour, future tax revenues and value flows that do not yet exist and 
dispossession strategies that have not yet been implemented (Harvey, 1999, pp. 265-67).  
These flows of capital, money, and credit – and their underlying class relations – 
constitute the world market as we know it today. So while for Marx the mobility of capital 
is inherently global (1973, 408) – so too does money capital involve momentary fixity in 
order to appropriate and use labour power and nature to produce value and extract profit 
(Harvey, 2001, p. 312). This territorialised reproduction of capitalist social relations is 
structured by competitive imperatives to accumulate money capital, reproducing the 
tensions between capital mobility and fixity (Henwood, 1998, p. 231). Once value is 
produced, it can circulate and come to rest in another spatial fix. In the processes of 
competition, capital mobility and fixity are not detached from their contexts and from social 
agency. Rather, competitive processes are shaped by class (inter- and intra-) struggle. From 
a historical materialist approach, social class is not just the division of society according to 
one’s income or market power but rather an understanding of how social relationships of 
production place historical beings into situations of antagonism: capitalists control the 
appropriation of surplus that workers produce with their labour power, which workers must 
sell in order to survive (Foster, 1990, 80-1).  
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This relationship between classes and capital fixity and mobility takes place under 
financialisation. Money, credit, and fictitious capital claims have grown quantitatively more 
significant in accumulation and qualitatively more powerful in how everyone’s lives are 
articulated within global capitalism (cf. Glyn, 2006; Lapavitsas, 2009). The rise of financial 
imperatives has nonetheless caused differences within the capitalist class and capital 
mobility and fixity to become blurry. For instance, the securitisation of real estate and 
production can create fictitious capital out of fixed investment (Fox Gotham, 2009, pp. 355-
71). Landed interests and real estate developers need to link their activities to financial 
assets for expansion (Harvey, 2010, 50). Global production firms that trade in stock 
exchanges and deal with financial derivatives need to fix their investments in low cost 
locations to produce profits. This interpretation offers an understanding of the ways in 
which the processes of fixity and mobility are internalised within capitalist firms. This 
provides an alternative understanding of capitalists, which are often analysed in terms of 
foreign vs. domestic capitalists and/or financial versus industrial fractions of capital, where 
the former seems more internationally financially oriented and the latter appears to be loyal 
to the national economy (Harvey, 1999, p. 316). 
Social classes are also connected to and shape the institutionalised political and 
economic practices of the state (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 25; cf. Jessop, 2010). The results of 
social struggles can be conceived of as institutionalisations of power relations, which of 
course extend beyond class to institutionalised gendered, racialised, and imperial and 
colonial power relations. The state is central to both the reproduction of the relationship 
between capital fixity and mobility as well as to the mediation of underlying social and 
class conflict (Brenner and Elden, 2009, pp. 359, 364, 367). The state is imbricated in 
processes of capital fixity and mobility as capital takes the form of the relocation of 
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production and investment via money across state borders and its re-territorialisation in 
specific political jurisdictions (Bryan, 2001, pp. 64-5). The way tensions between the fixity 
and mobility of capital are politically mediated and resolved (however fleeting) by state 
authorities depends on the historical specificity of the domestically situated class and power 
struggles (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 73). At the same time, state policy and practice influence the 
ways in which social classes relate to the fixity and mobility of capitalist social relations of 
production and exploitation. So too does such a framework leave open possibilities of 
change beyond capitalism through social struggle. 
Our geographical historical materialist framework emphasises that the spread and 
intensification of market-rule and capital relations are not processes automatically and 
seamlessly activated by capitalists and corporations but are rather everywhere 
institutionally implemented, domestically mediated, and actively funded by capitalist state 
authorities. Since the 1970s the neoliberal policies institutionalizing the intensification of 
market, profit, and financial imperatives alongside labour discipline and the 
commodification of all realms of social life have necessitated the action of state authorities 
(cf. Duménil and Lévy 2011; Marois 2012). The theoretical, empirical, and political 
challenge is rather to investigate how neoliberalism as a class project is simultaneously 
patterned and interconnected as well as context-specific (Brenner et al. 2010a, p. 184). For 
this we draw on the concept of variegated neoliberalism to compare context-dependent and 
interconnected neoliberal policies in Mexico and Turkey during and in the aftermath of the 
2008-09 crisis. The concept of variegated neoliberalism shows how regulatory restructuring 
is locally domesticated within the global parameters of neoliberalism. At the same time the 
success and the failures of local versions of neoliberalism lead to further rounds of policy 
experimentation that in turn re-shape global policy frameworks (cf. Peck, 2004; Brenner et 
 10 
al. 2010). Processes of domestication are not agentless but rather institutionally mediated 
and politically shaped by individual and collective social relations of struggle for economic 
and political power.  
A BACKGROUND TO CAPITAL FIXITY AND MOBILITY IN MEXICO AND 
TURKEY 
By the end of WWII, Mexico and Turkey’s developmental strategies aimed at producing 
for the domestic market and at sequencing the expansion of manufacturing capacity to 
replace imports. Despite experimentations with early forms of liberalization the post-war 
institutionalization of ISI developmental strategies meant that large domestic firms in 
Mexico and Turkey were tightly linked to capital fixity. Consequently state authorities 
aimed to protect domestic markets, their core source of profit realization, with restrictions 
on imported goods and foreign-direct and portfolio investment in both cases. At the same 
time, these domestic corporations were linked to international capital mobility through their 
active involvement in nascent domestic bank-based financial groups and associated links to 
international bank syndicates largely in the US and Europe (White, 1992, p. 59; Gültekin-
Karakaş, 2008). Still, the mobility of these groups’ financial assets was constrained by 
domestic capital controls deemed necessary for national developmental processes (Solís, 
1997, p. 19; Aydın, 2005, p. 35). The profits of financial groups remained closely tied to 
the fixity of their capital within Mexico and Turkey in the form of government protection, 
subsidies, domestic investment, and market expansion. Another way in which the process 
of capital mobility manifested itself in the ISI period, particular to the Mexican economy, 
was through export processing zones where foreign companies, mostly American, received 
the benefits of tax exemptions and used cheap labour to assemble manufactured products to 
be re-exported to the US. In both cases the very emergence of large domestic capital groups 
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in these two national contexts was premised on supportive state policies that produced and 
reproduced exploitative productive, political, and social relations that disproportionately 
benefited domestic capital groups even as organised labour made some relative 
distributional gains (Marois, 2012, p. 68).  
The 1979-82 US Volcker shock amidst mounting third world indebtedness led to 
the 1980s debt crisis that in turn triggered a phase of volatile and violent neoliberal 
transformations in peripheral capitalisms. Beginning in the 1980s both the Mexican and 
Turkish governments imposed increases in taxes and in the prices of public services on 
peasants, workers, and middle classes in order to help pay for foreign and public debts 
while making cuts to social programs and food subsidies (Correa, 2006, pp. 166-7; Yalman, 
2002). These two OECD members (Turkey 1960, Mexico 1994) have since suffered 
recurrent crises, the most notable being Mexico’s 1994-95 and Turkey’s 2001 financial 
crises. Far from undermining neoliberalism subsequent state-authored rescues and financial 
reforms preserved, renewed, and intensified the structurally unequal social relations of 
power and class characteristics of neoliberal capitalism (cf. Marois, 2011). In both countries 
neoliberal policies led to further disempowerment of the working classes and peasants.  
The 1980s debt and 1990s financial crises led Mexico and Turkey’s capitalist 
classes to restructure their articulation to capital mobility and fixity. With capital account 
liberalization measures being enacted in 1989 in both Mexico and Turkey large firms began 
concentrating more wealth and increasing their involvement in speculative, risky, but 
lucrative financial activities (Garrido, 2005, p. 100; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 
487). Neoliberal transformation also entailed processes of capital centralisation and 
concentration among the large capital groups as these companies extended ownership and 
control over larger portions of their economies. Centralisation entailed these ever-larger 
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groups tying together different stages of production and distribution by absorbing smaller 
firms and by diversifying assets to include everything from telecommunications, media 
broadcasting, construction, manufacturing, resource extraction, to of course banking and 
finance (Cokgezen, 2000). In both cases, albeit unevenly and amidst contestation, 
neoliberal state authorities supported and facilitated centralisation and concentration 
through policies that enabled everything from M&A barriers, to access to foreign capital, to 
new sources of dispossession (privatisation). Economic centralisation and concentration in 
a handful of companies at home facilitated the internationalisation of the largest Mexican 
and Turkish companies abroad via acquisitions, especially following Mexico’s 1994 crisis 
and Turkey’s 2001 crisis (UNCTAD, 2008; Kutlay 2011, p. 74). In this way large Mexican 
and Turkish capital groups internalised mobility and fixity within their firms as they 
required favourable political and economic conditions to accumulate via financial 
investment or direct investment abroad while relying on state policies to ensure these 
conditions of mobility and profits at home. 
Varied forms of concentration in Mexico and Turkey’s banking sectors reflect back 
on capital fixity and mobility. In Mexico the 1982 debt crisis led authorities to nationalise 
the entire banking sector. A change in government led to market-oriented bank 
restructuring processes intended to privatise the banks, which then occurred rapidly 
between 1991 and 1992. Privatisation resulted in the concentration banking ownership in 
the hands of Mexico’s richest individuals, mostly national shareholders (Vidal, 2002, pp. 
22-5). The 1995 pesos crisis, however, led to the eventual opening up to foreign bankers 
and over 80 per cent foreign control by 2002 (BIS, 2004, p. 9). The oligopolistic structure 
of Mexican banking remained intact with the domestic to foreign ownership swap. By 
contrast Turkey has experienced no such rapid and structural shifts in bank ownership 
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despite also suffering from the 1980s debt crisis and a financial crisis in 1994. Still, private 
bank ownership was concentrated in the largest holding groups through the 1990s. 
Distinctively, however, Turkey retained large state-owned commercial banks that 
controlled upwards of 40 per cent of banking assets (cf. BAT, 2009). Turkey’s 2001 
banking crisis, like Mexico’s 1994 crisis, led to stricter rules. State authorities had to 
bolster official supervision and regulation post crisis or risk the collapse of their domestic 
neoliberal projects. The reforms notably included tougher capital and liquidity 
requirements, yet the costs of such re-regulation were compensated by profitability returns 
nearly double that possible in the advanced capitalisms’ banking sectors (OECD 2010). The 
foreign banks in Mexico, in particular, have internalised profitability strategies that involve 
skimming off the best domestic clients, shying away from risky infrastructure and 
productive loans, and dealing in lucrative Mexican state debt certificates (Avalos and 
Trillo, 2006, p.  9; Guill n  omo, 2005, p. 248; Stallings, 2006, p. 197). Turkey’s large 
domestic banks have followed suit as have the restructured state banks, but to a lesser 
extent. In both cases an increasing chunk of all banks’ returns comes from charging higher 
fixed fees and commissions alongside dealing in high interest rate consumer credit (Acosta 
Córdova, 2013; Bakir and Öniş, 2010).  
The economic opening of the 1980s and 1990s also put export processing zones 
(EPZs) at the centre of economic policy (Middlebrook and Zepeda, 2003, p. 538). 
However, according to the ILO, while Mexico had 107 EPZs by 1997 Turkey had 11 (ILO 
1998). While growing in significance in Turkey today, the Mexican case is more 
pronounced. In Mexico and Turkey (to a lesser magnitude) these zones rely on the 
investment of large global corporations, particularly from the United States and Europe. 
The assembly plants are connected to capital mobility through global production networks 
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but also connected to capital fixity through their reliance on the closeness to American and 
European markets, production infrastructure, and most importantly to the legal and 
economic conditions provided by state authorities to access cheap labour. In Turkey, 
moreover, the ‘gap’ for cheap labour and export processing capacity has been filled in part 
by the so-called SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises). In Turkey, SMEs are often 
associated with eastern or ‘Anatolian’ capital (as opposed to the large capital groups known 
as ‘Istanbul’ capital). These small firms are very significant economically and politically 
and often linked to larger, export oriented conglomerates (Sarıaslan, 2004, p. 9). The SMEs 
internalise fixity and mobility in complex ways specific to Turkey but not unlike Mexico’s 
EPZs, insofar as their production is often tied to exports, if indirectly, but they are highly 
dependent on cheap and flexible labour in Turkey. 
Locating Social Forces 
Neoliberal transformations from the 1980s onwards distinctively strengthened particular 
economic actors in Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico, large Mexican companies, largely 
foreign-owned banks, firms in export processing zones, and investors in financial assets of 
large Mexican firms and public debt turned into influential forces within the capitalist class 
in Mexico. In Turkey, large Turkish companies and investors in firms and domestic debt 
became important influences within the capitalist class. However, the banks remain 
predominantly domestically-owned and tied to the large holding companies alongside three 
large state-owned banks and an only recently growing foreign bank presence. Additionally, 
SMEs and Anatolian-based capital have taken a place of almost parallel importance to the 
large Istanbul capital groups. 
These economic transformations did not occur in a political vacuum. A striking 
feature of the neoliberal era is that it has remained in place, however modified, despite 
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changes in party politics and any associated left–right ideological shift. In Mexico the 
authoritarian regime based on one state party, the Institutionalised Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), ruled the country for more than 70 years. In the 1980s and the 1990s the PRI assisted 
in the implementation of neoliberalism. The trend of economic concentration and the 
financial orientation of firms intensified after Vicente Fox, candidate for the centre-right 
Action National Party (PAN), won the 2000 presidential election  (Zepeda, 2011, p. 9). The 
switch from PRI to PAN did not create any ideological break but rather ensured neoliberal 
continuity and the continued power of capital over labour and the peasantry (cf.  lvare  
B  ar and  rtega Bre a, 2006). Cast in comparison, Turkey’s party history has been far 
more fragmented and polarised characterised by unstable coalitions, military coups, party 
dissolutions, and struggles between westernised secularist and religious conservative camps 
(cf. Tachau, 2000). Turkey shares, nonetheless, a highly authoritarian party structure and 
form of political rule ( ğu , forthcoming). Stable one party majority rule came after 
Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis and with the dramatic rise of the Islamic- and market-
oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan (cf. Sen, 2010). The AKP did not break with the rapid neoliberal 
restructuring initiated by the leftist-led coalition during the 2001 crisis, but instead 
intensified state and market restructuring over the next decade including aggressive 
financial reforms and privatisations. While large Istanbul capital has not lost out from AKP 
neoliberal transformation, certainly the AKP consolidated and promoted the fortunes of 
Islamic capital with its traditional Anatolian base. 
Three decades of variegated neoliberal transformation in Mexico and Turkey, which 
led to processes of capital centralisation and concentration and financialisation, set the 
institutional and material conditions from which capital and state authorities responded to 
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the global financial crisis’ impact on their societies in 2008-09. It is out of the scope of this 
paper to analyse the origins of the global crisis. However, the crisis manifested itself in the 
form of mortgage foreclosures in the US, mainly subprime, collapsing mortgage lenders, 
investment banks and hedge funds collapsed in 2007 (Martin. 2011, pp.592-3). The 
financial crisis spread over global credit markets as returns on risk increased rapidly and 
liquidity diminished (Eichengreen et al., 2012, p. 1301). The initial impact of the crisis on 
Europe and the US had serious consequences on Mexico and Turkey, as these countries 
rely economically for export markets and incoming investments. This will be analysed in 
the following section through the lens of capital mobility and fixity. 
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Table 1: Comparative Indicators, Mexico and Turkey, 2007 to 2012  
Indicator Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  
GDP Growth Turkey 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.0 7.5 2.0 
 Mexico 3.4 1.2 -6.0 5.6 3.9 3.8 
Public sector debt as per cent of GDP Turkey 39.9 40.0 46.1 42.2 39.1 36.2 
 Mexico 37.8 43.1 44.5 42.9 43.8 43.1 
Unemployment rate Turkey 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 - - 
 Mexico 3.7 4.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 4.8 
Foreign direct investment (net, billions $) Turkey 19.9 17.0 6.9 7.8 12.6 16.2 
 Mexico 31.3 27.8 16.5 21.3 21.6 12.6 
Portfolio investment assets (billions $) net 
acquisition financial assets 
 
Turkey 1.9 1.2 2.7 3.5 -2.7 -2.7 
 Mexico 14.7 -14.2 34.5 5.4 -6.0 8.3 
Portfolio investment liabilities (net 
incurrence of liabilities)  
Turkey 2.8 -3.8 2.9 19.6 19.3 38.1 
 Mexico 13.3 4.8 15.3 37.7 40.6 81.3 
Gross foreign reserves (CBT); (billions $) Turkey 76.2 74.0 73.8 86.6 90.1 86.3 
 Mexico 71.3 95.3 99.9 120.6 149.2 170.2 
Real minimum wages (US dollars per 
hour) 
Turkey 3.4 3.4 2.9 3 2.8 2.7 
 Mexico 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Consumer prices (index 2005=100) Turkey -- -- 141.0 153.1 163.0 177.5 
 Mexico -- -- 119.2 124.2 128.4 133.7 
Inflation  Turkey -- 10.4 6.3 8.6 6.5 8.9 
 Mexico -- 5.1 5.3 4.2 3.4 4.1 
IMF 2012a, 47-55; BAT 2012, vi-vii; IMF 2012b (Mexico), 30; 33, 34; INEGI, 2013; IMF Data Mapper 
(http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/);  OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org); UNCTAD Stat  
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx). 
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THE VARIED REACTIONS OF CAPITAL TO CRISIS 
Between 2008 and 2009 the specific competitive and accumulation strategies of different 
capitals to crisis in Mexico and Turkey varied according to their specific articulation to 
fixity and mobility, revealing the powerful agency of capital amidst crises. National 
variation, however, does not preclude some generalizing thrusts, three of which are 
apparent in Mexico and Turkey. These include each society’s experiences with (1) capital 
flight; (2) reduced domestic production; and (3) an outperforming banking sector.  
First, in Mexico capital flows in portfolio (liabilities) and foreign direct investment 
decreased between 2007 and 2008 (Table 1). Foreign direct investment experienced a fifty 
per cent reduction between 2007 and 2009. Mexican and foreign firms contributed to this 
capital mobility in different ways. Large Mexican corporations moved their money abroad 
in the form of FDI. Greenfield investment abroad by large Mexican firms increased from 
842 million dollars in 2008 to 1.91 billion in 2009 and 2.57 in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011, pp. 
196, 207). Fearing losses and instability, financial investors and banks shifted their money 
capital away from the Mexican economy into other currencies, notably the US dollar. In 
turn, this caused Mexican stocks to decline as the Mexican peso depreciated by 4.2 per cent 
in 2008 (Froymovich, 2009, p. C8). In some instances, corporations like that of Banamex 
(Citigroup’s Mexican subsidiary) paid 1.4 billion dollars to its American headquarters to re-
capitalise its faltering core operations, resulting in cuts to new lending (Redacción, 2010). 
Large Mexican firms with investment in financial derivatives also contributed to this 
outflow when they paid their losses in derivatives in US dollars. These firms had used 
derivatives to obtain US dollars at low interest rates, paid these loans with yields from their 
investment in Mexican pesos, and obtained profits from the difference between lending 
rates in the US and investment rates in Mexican pesos. Several Mexican firms reported 
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losses in derivatives operations that totalled 8 billion dollars (US) between 2008 and 2009 
(Reyes, 2009). 
In Turkey portfolio flows (liabilities) also reversed course between 2007 and 2008 
and FDI steadily fell between 2007 and 2009 (Table 1). In contrast to Mexico, however, 
Turkey’s largest corporations tended not to move their money abroad. Outward investment 
flows instead slowed from $2.6 billion in 2008 to $1.6 billion in 2009 (Kadir Has 2011). 
Some large corporations opted to halt investments in a ‘wait and see’ strategy while others 
took advantage of the state’s recovery package and tax breaks to update operations at home. 
In a further divergence of note from Mexico the obscure balance sheet item ‘net errors and 
omissions’ registered capital inflows of nearly $15 billion US dollars from  ctober 2008 to 
June 2009 – that is, unofficial and unrecorded repatriation Turkish corporate foreign 
savings – that presumably went to paying off foreign debts (Uygur, 2010, p. 27). This 
helped to mitigate the still-significant capital flight out of Turkey as investors turned to the 
security of the US dollar. This, like in Mexico, exerted downward pressure on the stock 
market indexes and affected the value of the currencies. Foreign investors shed stocks and 
bonds on the ISE as its value dropped by 35 per cent from mid-September 2008 to March 
2009 (Ö dabakoğlu, 2009). This put enormous pressure on the Turkish Lira as the US 
dollars soared by 40 per cent against the Lira. However, the derivatives so important to the 
specificity of Mexico’s crisis were not significant in Turkey (Ö dabakoğlu, 2009). Like 
Citibank Mexico, the profitable operations of foreign banks Fortis and Dexia in Turkey 
were used to bolster their failing operations in Europe. By and large, however, the 
enormous profit opportunities in Turkey meant bank capital stayed put, albeit in slightly 
modified form. The private banks generally rolled over existing loans but cut back on new 
loans in real terms. The three large state-owned banks, by contrast, increased lending across 
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the board. Both the private and state banks shifted assets into government debt in efforts to 
preserve profits and decrease lending risks amidst crisis (Mihaljek, 2010). 
Second, the crisis-generated lack of global effective demand, alongside capital 
flight, impacted domestic production in Mexico and Turkey. Both Mexican and Turkish 
capitals slowed their domestic investment and production. Industrial activity in Mexico 
decreased 12 per cent in 2009 over 2008 while fixed capital formation declined 10 per cent 
in the same period (INEGI, 2013). Capacity utilisation fell slightly from 79.7 per cent at the 
beginning of 2007 to 76.6 per cent at the end of 2009 (INEGI, 2013). At the same time, 
domestic aggregate demand declined in 2009 and wages remained stagnant while prices 
rose faster than wages (Table 1). This was partly the result of the strategies of global 
corporations in Mexican export processing zones. These companies slowed down 
production in Mexico and channelled the returns of their sales to the payment of financial 
obligations and boosting the price of their bonds and stocks (Morales, 2010). Still, the 
initial devaluation of the peso during the global crisis lowered the costs of production in 
Mexico, which made Mexico once again an attractive site for foreign direct investment, 
mostly American companies, particularly in export processing zones in the electronics and 
auto sectors because of rising wages in China and cheaper transportation costs from Mexico 
to American markets (Luhnow and Davis, 2012, p. A12).  
Turkish industrial output likewise fell as private fixed capital investments dropped 
by 10 per cent in 2009 over 2008 (CBT, 2010, p. 33). Capacity utilisation sat near Mexico’s 
in 2007, at about 80 per cent, before collapsing to just over 60 per cent by early 2009 as 
manufacturers reduced existing stocks and overcapacity (CBT, 2011, p. 10). Turkey, too, 
suffered from lower levels of private domestic demand to GDP growth, which collapsed 
from 5 per cent in 2007 to -1.8 in 2008 to -8.3 in 2009 (IMF, 2012, p. 47). Like Mexico, 
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Turkish exporters sought to reduce labour costs by holding down wages below inflation in 
addition to initiating work stoppages and staff layoffs (Table 1; Öztürk, 2012, p. 70). While 
some Turkish exporters cut production (by about half by early 2009) and employment 
(down by about 15 per cent) to protect profits, other exporters responded in a similar way 
but also tried to re-orient Turkish exports to other-than-Western markets (notably to the 
Middle East, especially the Gulf countries, and to Africa) (Uygur, 2010, p. 18). Turkey 
reduced dependence on Europe and the US whereas Mexico continued relying on American 
markets. 
The crisis revealed capitalists' distinct ties to capital fixity and mobility in the 
context of financialisation. Their distinct linkages to international finance and fixed 
processes of national production, circulation, and realisation shaped their responses to the 
crisis and created new sources of frictions among large firms, both national and foreign. 
Large Mexican firms, including domestic and foreign banks, had more vested interests in 
capital fixity in Mexico than financial investors. The former relied more on their Mexican 
operations, domestic markets, and peso assets to realise an important share of their profits 
even though international capital mobility offered them the possibility to escape capital 
devaluation and find cheaper production sites outside of Mexico. Large Mexican firms also 
required a strong peso to reduce exchange rate risk in their foreign direct investment and 
financial operations in international financial markets. By contrast, exporting firms’ main 
interests were not only tax exemptions but also a relatively low exchange rate. A strong 
peso threatened the competitiveness of their exports and diminished their gains from using 
cheap Mexican labour despite the gains appreciation gave exporters when purchasing 
inputs from abroad. As such, the interests of the export sector on peso devaluation diverged 
from financial investors, banks, and Mexican oligopolies requirements of a strong peso. 
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In Turkey foreign investment capital likewise had a strong interest in securing their 
mobility of capital out of Turkey and back in once conditions proved more favourable. By 
contrast, Turkey’s large domestic holding groups (Istanbul capital) aimed to secure 
profitability at home but to augment this by trying to access cheap foreign capital. Their 
interests are complex and sometimes contradictory, so not easily summarised. Since 
internationalizing after the 1980s much of their domestic production is for export, yet many 
intermediate inputs and energy are imported. This led the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly 
(TIM) to demand that the Central Bank intervene to moderate the TL exchange rate (neither 
let it appreciate nor depreciate too much in any direction). However, these groups’ assets 
also often include major domestic retail wings and media outlets (Yapı ve Kredi Bank, 
Akbank, and Garanti Bank respectively). As the crisis intensified by early 2009 calls from a 
representative arm of Istanbul capital, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialist Businessmen’s 
Association), focused on Turkey securing a deal with the IMF to decrease foreign 
borrowing costs by having state authorities extend official guarantees on their debts. By 
contrast, a representative arm of Anatolian capital, MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialist 
Businessmen’s Association), strongly resisted an IMF deal since it came with tax reform 
requirements that would impact them most directly (that is, by increasing tax enforcement 
thus threatening their implicit, if illicit, ‘tax-breaks’). 
In different ways, capitalists in Mexico and Turkey were financially-oriented but 
territorially attached in different ways to their domestic economies in the form of 
production, dispossession, and credit. This suggests that the national or international legal 
origin of firms did not determine a particular commitment to the national fixity or global 
mobility of capital. In fact, the capitalist classes had different intra-class stakes in the global 
mobility and national fixity of capital, which varied by society and its productive and 
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financial integration into the world market. So too would this diversity shape domestic 
policy responses to the onset of crisis in 2008-09. 
THE VARIED REACTIONS OF STATE AUTHORITIES TO CRISIS 
In 2008-09, the internalising and adaptation to fixity and mobility by state authorities 
facilitated the reconstitution of global capitalism and neoliberal class rule in Mexico and 
Turkey. The specific policy responses of course varied according to each society’s specific 
problems of capital accumulation and neoliberal class rule generated by the 2008-09 crisis. 
Nonetheless, six general categories are evident and involved managing them in particular 
ways: (1) domestic interest rates; (2) international reserves; (3) loan guarantees and access 
to liquidity; (4) taxation; (5) public debt management; and (6) stimulus. 
First, domestic interest rates became a focal point of policy formation. The Mexican 
central bank or Banxico under the PAN Presidential Administration increased interest rates 
in 2008 from 7.50 to 8.25 per cent in order to lower inflation (Banxico, 2009a, p.12). This 
was consistent with Mexico’s monetary policy of inflation targeting since 2001. The 
Mexican central bank has raised the interbank overnight rate (tasa de fondeo bancario) 
when inflation increases beyond the inflation target and vice versa. The present target of a 
rate of inflation is three per cent with a band of one percentage point. This measure did not 
stop prices from increasing, and instead, had negative effects on economic growth as firms’ 
credit costs rose. For that reason, Banxico cut interest rates from 8.25 per cent to 4.50 per 
cent in 2009. In Turkey, by contrast, the Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee from 
the beginning of the crisis initiated sharp cuts to its policy rate. The widely regarded 
unorthodox measure saw interest rates slashed from 16.75 per cent in October 2008 to 6.75 
per cent in October 2009 (CBT, 2010, p. 6). Contrary to conventional thought, inflation fell 
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to 6.5 per cent, its lowest level since 1968, thus enabling the CBT to continue reducing 
interest rates within its inflation targeting mandate (BAT, 2010, pp 1-2; BAT, 2009). 
Second, Banxico and the Central Bank of Turkey used international reserves to 
provide liquidity to large firms to cover liabilities in US dollars and maintain the value of 
the peso. For instance, in Mexico the initial depreciation of the peso during the 2008-09 
crisis led to losses in derivatives held by large Mexican firms, which increased the demand 
for US dollars. This depreciated the peso by 25 per cent (Banxico, 2009b, p. 81). The 
central bank supplied from its international reserves to prevent further depreciation 
(Moreno, 2010, p. 74). The general strategy of the central bank was to increase foreign 
exchange liquidity through a rule that set the daily amount to be auctioned with a minimum 
price floor of two per cent above the previous working day exchange rate (Cuadra, Sidaoui 
and Ramos-Francia, 2010, p. 288). In 2008, this daily auction was set at 400 million, which 
was lowered to 250 million by May 2009. There were exceptions to this rule in 2009. To 
guarantee liquidity, a swap of 30 billion US dollars was established with the US Federal 
Reserve in 2008 and a Flexible Credit line was negotiated with the IMF in 2009 for 30 
billion dollars (Banxico, 2009a, pp. 69-72). To defend the Mexican peso, Banxico also 
remunerated US dollar deposits kept in the central bank (Cuadra et al., 2010, p. 288). While 
Banxico injected liquidity into the economy, the National Commission of Banking and 
Securities set limits on the profits that foreign banking subsidiaries could transfer to their 
headquarters abroad (BBVA Research, 2012, p.3). 
Turkish authorities, to a lesser extent, increased foreign exchange liquidity so 
domestic capital could service foreign commitments. The selling off of international 
reserves was also intended to smooth TL exchange rate volatility (down 40 per cent to the 
USD). It was not until March 2009 in a series of 18 auctions, however, the CBT auctioned 
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900 million US dollars in reserves (cf. BAT, 2010, pp. I-4). State authorities facilitated 
domestic liquidity early on by other creative ways. Notably, the AKP government enacted 
the ‘Law on Repatriation of Capital or Tax Peace and Asset  epatriation Programme’ in 
November 2008 (PDMR, 2009, p. 13). The voluntary scheme was pitched in terms of 
generating an economic boost while allowing individuals and corporations to repatriate 
previously unclaimed or illegally held foreign assets legally (the ‘Peace’ aspect) subject to 
a minimal two per cent tax, drawing in over 31 billion US dollars but generated a meagre 1 
billion US dollars in tax revenue by the end of 2009. Amidst this the AKP government 
maintained a strategy of entertaining, if never completing, talks with the IMF from late 
2008 until mid-2009 but without ever signing a formal deal (Aydın, 2013, p. 104). 
Third, the PAN and AKP offered different types of loan guarantees and access to 
liquidity to the private sector. In Mexico, Banxico lent US dollars to commercial and 
development banks, drawing on a foreign currency swap line with the US Federal Reserve, 
totalling 3.22 billion dollars in the form of loans to private firms via commercial and 
development banks (Banxico, 2010, pp. 69-72). In 2009, the central bank also auctioned 
interest rate swaps for up to 50 million US dollars to enable credit institutions to exchange 
their exposure to financial assets with fixed rates and long term maturities for short-term 
instruments with variable rates, reducing their risk structure and the duration of the credit 
institutions’ assets (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 292-3). Change in regulations allowed 
commercial banks to use new eligible assets as collateral to access liquidity from Banxico 
at lower rates. Development banks such as NAFINSA and Bancomext provided short-term 
financing in the form of guarantees on securities issued by firms, insuring up to 50 per cent 
of the securities issued (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 291-2). In contrast to the PAN, the AKP 
directed loan guarantees and supports towards productive sectors like agriculture, SMEs, 
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and large firms, mainly through two large Turkish state-owned banks, Ziraat and Halk, 
which drew on the government guarantee schemes. These banks increased loans from 
between 15 to 25 per cent in 2009 over 2008 levels (BAT, 2010, pp. I-3). State authorities 
also increased the credit and guarantee levels of the state-owned Export Credit bank of 
Turkey). At the same time, and to stem any possible gutting of the banks’ capital, the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) began authorizing the banks’ 
distributions of earnings to shareholders in 2009. Official re-regulation by the BRSA in 
January 2009 allowed banks to restructure and reclassify weaker securities and loans in 
2008 as performing to enhance the appearance of financial health, reduced FX lending 
terms and interest rates and reserve requirements for FX liabilities (cf. IMF, 2010b; CBT, 
2010, p. 37).  
Fourth, authorities manipulated taxation, but in different ways. The PAN 
Administration in Mexico increased taxes in order to finance previous policy responses to 
the crisis. While taxes did not increase in 2008 and 2009, the value-added tax (VAT) was 
increased one per cent and income taxes rose three per cent in 2010. As a result non-oil 
revenues increased 12.1 and 2.4 per cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Yet, there was a 
45.4 per cent increase in VAT returns during 2011 in comparison to the previous year 
because large firms and investors can claim credits on this tax, whereas individuals, 
particularly workers, cannot (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011, p. 27). Also, operations in stock 
and other financial markets remained tax exempted. Turkey did not increase taxes (in fact, 
resisted this by resisting an IMF package). Instead, authorities relied on increasing public 
debt to finance its stimulus package, which the domestic banks eagerly bought up. In fact 
VATs decreased to boost consumption on automobiles, consumer durables, and heavy-duty 
machines and equipment from 18 per cent to 8 per cent. This VAT cut also applied to 
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computers, IT, office technologies, and office furniture as well as for SME purchases of 
industrial machines. 
Fifth, Mexico and Turkey’s Ministries of Finance focused on public debt 
management. In 2008 the Mexican Treasury reduced long-term bond issuance during the 
fourth quarter of 2008. The goal was to prevent further closing of investors’ positions in 
long-term government bonds. Later, the Mexican Treasury issued and swapped short-term 
instruments in pesos for long-term government debt (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011, pp. 21, 
68). As a result, public sector debt increased (Table 1). While the Turkish Treasury entered 
into the crisis period in a relatively favourable position of having a 1.8 per cent budget 
surplus, it nonetheless had to contend with shortening debt maturities by the end of 2008, 
which fell from 34 to 32 months due to global instabilities and capital flight (PDMR, 2009, 
pp. 15, 18). Authorities maintained Turkey’s preceding trend of internalizing public debt 
(Table 1).  
Sixth, both countries unrolled rather limited, albeit distinct, stimulus packages. The 
Mexican government’s stimulus packages launched in 2008 mostly promoted investment in 
infrastructure and expanded access to credit for the construction sector as well as private 
and public mortgage institutions (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011; FMI, 2011, p. 40). 
Subsidies for exporting companies producing vehicles, auto parts, electronics and 
machinery were also part of the stimulus package. The Ministry of the Economy allowed 
companies to have production stoppages while absorbing some of the labour costs. In 
exchange, planned job cuts had to be limited to a third of the decline of sales (Galhardi, 
2010, pp. 1-2) Resources were channelled to an expansion of social security coverage to 
workers forced into early retirement, workers’ training and scrapping schemes and 
government, private sector (ILO, 2010.) Also, the budget for the poverty alleviation 
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program Oportunidades increased 60 per cent (Feliz Herrera, 2011).However, the 
importance of programs related to workers and anti-poverty projects in the stimulus 
package was not as significant as infrastructure spending and production subsidies. This 
stimulus package represented 1.6 per cent of Mexico’s 2009 GDP.  
Turkey’s stimulus package, unlike in Mexico, was not unveiled until just ahead of 
local elections in March 2009 (OECD, 2012, p. 14). It also focused primarily on raising 
domestic consumption through VAT to help capital reduce domestic capitals’ 
overproduction stocks (Öniş and Güven, 2011, p. 5). Some infrastructure expenditures were 
increased for the Southeastern Anatolia Project and corporate tax breaks provided to help 
relocate production to the East especially (PDMR, 2009, p. 13). This complimented the 
AKP regional strategy of locating labour intensive but globally competitive production to 
the east of Turkey where the Kurdish population seemingly offers a cheaper source of 
labour (Öztürk, 2012, p. 72). By contrast, the AKP extendied unemployment benefits, 
temporary and part-time employment and, a new program for temporary public 
employment, public internship, and vocational training. The overall stimulus package 
represented 3.4 per cent of 2009 GDP. 
VARIEGATED FIXITY AND MOBILITY, BUT NO LESS NEOLIBERAL MEXICO 
AND TURKEY 
The variegated and sometimes contrasting results show how Mexico and Turkey represent 
two different but nonetheless neoliberal projects shaped by relatively mobile capital and 
relatively fixed internal class and accumulation structures. In Mexico the internalisation of 
the dynamics of mobility and fixity within large Mexican firms and financial investors 
shaped authorities’ policy responses to the crisis. The authorities’ initial increase in interest 
rates in the crisis period intended to keep portfolio investment in Mexico to prevent 
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devaluation of the peso and inflation. When inflation increased and domestic and foreign 
investors took their money out of Mexico, Banxico lowered interest rates to ease liquidity 
for firms that still had investment in the country, especially large firms. The authorities’ 
policy preferences for large firms can be seen in the form of loans and liquidity facilities 
because such measures were directed towards improving Mexican firms’ and banks’ 
balance sheets and their risk structure. The latter was done through the use of derivatives by 
the central bank while loans were directed to guarantee private sectors’ securities. As a 
result, only a handful of firms received the benefits of these programs due to the 
concentration of the Mexican stock exchange in a handful of firms (BMV, 2010, p. 36). It is 
worth noting that the Mexican central bank and the Ministry of Finance did not react 
mechanically to the foreign exchange needs of capital, but rather devised mechanisms to 
favour private sector’s access to funds while protecting the value of the peso. For that 
reason, loan and liquidity government mechanisms for large firms and banks were 
denominated in pesos and limits on foreign liabilities in banks remained in place. Overall, 
economic and financial policy targeted the value of the peso, favouring large Mexican 
firms, banks and investors in public debt. Stimulus packages were also directed to subsidise 
production of large firms instead of overall general consumption. These policy responses 
show how state policy tried to reconcile the internalised tensions of capital fixity and 
mobility within firms. The deep integration of large Mexican firms to global financial 
markets through FDI and derivatives and the close connections of both domestic and 
international financial investors to the Mexican economy through public debt, which is a 
reference in several global indexes including the World Government Bond Index, 
influenced policies that focused mainly on the worthiness of the peso, low inflation, access 
to foreign exchange and guarantees on private securities. This in turn hints at the close 
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nexus of the capitalist class in Mexico to capital mobility. At the same time, regressive 
taxation and the stimulus package also tried to deal with capitalists’ interests in fixity 
within Mexico in order to increase yields in their investment in public debt and facilitate 
profitable investment in production and construction. 
So too in Turkey has the internalisation of mobility and fixity within Turkish firms, 
larger and smaller, and financial investors shaped authorities’ policy responses to the crisis. 
Authorities’ policies initially reflected the needs of large corporations to shed existing 
stocks, especially in consumer durables and autos, and to increase domestic liquidity for 
smaller firms. In response the Central Bank systematically reduced its policy rate and eased 
domestic liquidity requirements while the government, much later, provided VAT cuts for 
these goods as part of it delayed stimulus. As inflation continued to fall so too could the 
Central Bank’s policy rate continue its decline. This led to a falling lira, which was thought 
to be nonetheless overvalued by as much as 25 to 60 per cent to the US dollar pre-crisis 
(Uygur, 2010, p. 56). While this increased the repayment costs of foreign currency 
borrowings for large holding groups, a moderated fall increased Turkey’s export 
competitiveness, benefiting both Istanbul and Anatolian capital. But while the government 
aimed to increased domestic liquidity via eased reserve requirements the private banks in 
fact reduced lending. State banks did increase credit dramatically to help compensate. As 
Turkey’s stimulus response was delayed until early 2009, by this time large holding groups 
had regained access to international markets freeing up authorities to respond to SME 
demands for credit support. While piecemeal and delayed, authorities crafted policy around 
their most organised and powerful domestic capital constituents.  
The varied reactions of capital and state authorities to the 2008-09 crisis have 
seemingly yielded positive ends as many economic indicators in Mexico and Turkey since 
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indicate. In Mexico GDP bounced back in 2010 and 2011 while Turkey’s GDP bump was 
even more significant in the same period (Table 1). The Mexican Stock Exchange rose 12.4 
per cent from the beginning to the end of 2010. The Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 Index 
reached an all-time high with returns jumping 21 per cent in US dollar terms (BAT, 2012, 
viii). Mexican and Turkish bank profits (as return on equity) ranked near the top of the G-
20 with Mexico’s banks hitting 16.8 per cent in 2010 and 15.5 in 2011 and Turkey’s banks 
outperforming at 23.9 in 2010 and 18.9 in 2011 (BAT, 2012a, p. 63). The accumulation of 
international reserves reached historical records in both countries, although Mexico far 
outpaced Turkey (Table 1). The IMF reports exports in Mexico and Turkey and inflation 
decreased in both countries (Table 1). While not without reservations, capital in Mexico 
and Turkey – especially given the overarching context of the Great Recession in the 
advanced capitalisms – were doing phenomenally well. 
The seemingly positive outcomes of the 2008-09 crisis have not been distributed to 
the benefit of workers and the majority in these societies. So is it in Mexico and Turkey. 
According to the OECD (2011) Mexico and Turkey are still among the worst off in the 
OECD despite impressive post-crisis GDP growth indicators. These two societies remain 
the second and third most unequal within the OECD by the Gini coefficient. Mexico ranks 
the worst in poverty protection while Turkey sits at fifth worst. In terms of the enigmatic 
OECD ‘social justice’ indicator, Turkey ranks the worst followed immediately by Mexico. 
Aside from perhaps maintaining a job for which they are effectively making less doing, 
your average worker has come out poorer from the 2008-09 crisis. The stimulus packages 
have not reduced unemployment rates significantly since 2009 and real minimum wages 
have decreased while prices have increased faster than wages (Table 1).  
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Still, the way financialisation and neoliberalism worsen social inequality does not 
takes place is automatic and homogeneous ways but are rather shaped by the internal class 
structures and the political conditions of a country. In Mexico, targeting wages temporarily 
solved the global exporting firms’ concerns over export competitiveness and left the strong 
peso policy intact. Thus the interests the exporting industries connected to global 
production companies through low wages became compatible with the interests of large 
Mexican companies’ goal of low production costs in their Mexican operations in order to 
increase the margins between profits and direct investment, and therefore the value of their 
stocks and bonds. Profitable yields in public debt, which sustained reserve accumulation 
and a strong peso, required debt repayment, and, therefore, an increase in non-oil revenues. 
In Mexico, this was accompanied by regressive taxation, which allowed the accumulation 
of new resources to sustain debt management and reserve accumulation strategies. This 
strategy was central to the mediation of internalised tensions of capital fixity and mobility 
as financially oriented large Mexican companies and financial investors received the 
benefits of these strategies while imposing the costs of the crisis on middle and working 
classes. The weakening of middle and working classes in the aftermath of the 2008-09 
crisis set the conditions for the labour reform in 2012, which led to the further 
flexibilisation of labour conditions under the PAN administration with the support of the 
PRI. This reform allows outsourcing, the use of private firms to hire temporary workers and 
increases part-time work in the country. In Turkey, too, targeting wages and labour 
flexibility temporarily eased international competitiveness problems (in addition to the 
benefits of a weakening lira). Wage and flexible employment measures alongside 
inducements for capital to move to low wages regions likewise emphasised the need to 
keep capital fixed within Turkey’s borders. This was goal shared by both Istanbul and 
 33 
Anatolian capital, albeit in different parts of Turkey. In mid-2009 with the AKP unveiled 
the Temporary Labour Law (Number 592) which facilitated employers’ access to cheaper 
and more flexible workers by allowing companies to hire temporary staff through private 
offices. The government then increased public debt to pay for the stimulus package that 
unabashedly benefited domestic capital, large and small alike. Unlike Mexico, the costs 
were not immediately socialised by VAT increases, though the AKP refusal to undertake 
tax reforms meant the average worker would pay disproportionately for it in the future 
anyway. Rather VAT reductions sought to induce greater individual consumption. While 
stimulus packages varied in both Mexico and Turkey, the targeting of labour through state 
policy was central to mediating the contradictions between fixity and mobility within its 
capitalist class during the 2009-9 crisis. 
CONCLUSION  
With the world’s advanced capitalisms continuing to stagnate long after 2009, mobile 
capital had to seek out peripheral locations to invest and valorise capital. This led to a 
seemingly strong recovery in Mexico and Turkey. This bounce-back recovery enabled state 
authorities, pushed and supported by domestic capital in different ways, to actively 
reconstitute the global policy framework of neoliberalism through domestic policy 
formation and crisis management. This occurred through variegated processes of trial-and-
error domestically vis-à-vis world market-based regulatory parameters negotiated and set at 
larger international scales. While differing in specific content the form of Mexico and 
Turkey’s state responses to the crisis ensured continuity in their foregoing neoliberal 
strategies of development and capital accumulation, most notably in the continued 
oppression of workers. That is, the prevailing strategy of accumulation continues to be 
variegated neoliberalism. This is defined not by any specific matrix of policies alone but by 
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the shared defeat of organised labour and popular classes’ capacity to resist market-oriented 
restructuring and austerity that disproportionately benefits capital. It should be reiterated 
that policy formation does not exclusively respond to the general interests of capitalists, but 
rather involves a process of negotiation among capitalist classes and state authorities 
influenced by the resistance and demands of subordinated classes. This explains why 
workers in Mexico and Turkey have disproportionately born the costs of state policy 
responses through regressive taxation, lower wages, and the socialisation of accumulation 
risks.  
A critical assessment of fixity and mobility can help inform progressive alternative 
policies and institutions. Further research needs to target and assess actually existing policy 
alternatives and practices. However, for our purposes, we can signal two fruitful directions 
for such research building on the foregoing historical materialist geographical analysis. The 
first direction is the need to locate power relations along the lines of capital mobility and 
fixity in order to critically analyse the limits of domestic stimulus packages. Without doing 
so, domestic stimulus packages might end up reinforcing existing structures of capitalist 
power within a country. The second direction is the importance of understanding emerging 
capitalisms as central spaces in the constitution of global frameworks of neoliberalism 
rather than peripheral ones. Such a view emphasises the importance of progressive social 
change in those economies in order to encourage alternative policy formation globally.  
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